The NorMaTIve SySTeM aS a SeT oF NorMS
In his recent work on normative conlict resolution, Andrej Kristan (forthcoming) adopted the theoretical approach to normativity introduced by Alchourrón and Bulygin (1998) . According to the set-theoretic approach presented in Alchourrón and Bulygin (1998) , any sentence p describing "doable" states of afairs is a normative sentence: obligatory if p belongs to the set of logical consequences of "explicitly commanded propositions", permitted if its negation ¬p does not belong to the set, and prohibited if not permitted. 1 he metaphor for prescriptive use of language is that of putting something into a container (a proposition into the norm-set). he metaphor should not be stretched too far since sets unlike containers have no identity other than what is * bzarnic@fst.hr | Professor in Philosophy at the University of Split, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. ** gbasic@fst.hr | Assistant in Philosophy at the University of Split, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. 1 he term 'doable states of afairs' is taken from von Wright (1999) and denotes 'states of afairs which can come to obtain as the result of human action' .
Consistency and deductive closure
In classical logic, a set of propositions is deductively closed just in case the negation of any non-member of the original set can be consistently added to it. 2 his fact is symbolically represented by the formula (1.1). 3 = Cn( ) if ⊥ Cn( ∪ {¬p}) for all p (1.1)
he notions of consequence and consistency are interdeinable and are both about desirable properties. Is there a reason to regard deductive closure as a property more fundamental than consistency? In this paper we will try to show that there is no order of precedence between these properties. Let the set of contents of explicit commands be the starting point of our analysis. his set is devoid of any inherent logical properties and its creation is an empirical fact brought about by the use of language. 4 Example 1. Goble (2009: 484-5) and Broome (2013: 121-2 ) disagree on the question whether a normative system containing the explicitly commanded proposition (i) 'here shall be no camping at any time on public streets' must also include the proposition (ii) 'here shall be no camping on public streets on hursday night' . Only if the normative system is deined as a set of all logical consequences of explicit commands, must the answer be in the airmative, but 2 For the let-to-right direction, suppose, for the purpose of a reductio ad absurdum, that the negation of a non-member cannot be consistently added to the deductively closed set. If so, then the non-member of the set is a consequence of it, which is impossible since it is deductively closed. For the right-to-let direction, suppose, for the purpose of a reductio ad absurdum, that an arbitrary sentence is a consequence of the set but not its member. If so, the negation of the sentence can be consistently added to the set, which is impossible if the sentence is a consequence of the set. 3 he formula ⊥ says that falsum ⊥ is an element in or, in other words, that is inconsistent. he negation of the former formula is ⊥ and it says that is consistent. 4 In Broome's (2013) theory of requirements, a code delivers a set of propositions closed under congruence, i.e., if a proposition belongs to the set, then so does any proposition equivalent to it. In our approach, all properties, including congruence, are abstracted away. Metanormative Principles and norm governed Social interaction there are compelling reasons against it, as Broome shows. On the other hand, as Goble notes, the relation between (i) and (ii) concerns "one's reasoning with ought-statements". We will try to show here that both positions are correct.
Perfection properties and norm-sets
Extending von Wright's line of thought, we will show that deductive closure can be understood as one among other perfection-properties.
[C]lassic deontic logic, on the descriptive interpretation of its formulas, pictures a gapless and contradiction-free system of norms. A factual normative order may have these properties, and it may be thought desirable that it should have them. But can it be a truth of logic that a normative order has ("must have") these "perfection"-properties? Von Wright (1999: 32) Standard or classical KD deontic logic accepts the interdeinability of the modal operators of obligation O, prohibition F and permission P as stated in (Def.) and graphically represented in Figure 1 . 5 KD deontic logic extends propositional logic with the necessitation rule (RN) and axiom schemata (K) and (D).
Figure 1: he hexagon of logical relations holding in standard KD deontic logic. he dotted line represents the contrariety relation, the dashed line represents contradiction, the full line represents subcontrariety, and the arrows represent subalternation (implication). Deontic concepts are expressed in natural language in the let hexagon while the right hexagon presents the corresponding formulas. 
Translating modal language to set-theoretic language
In Žarnić (2010), translation from the language of standard deontic logic without iterated operators is deined and it is proved that translated conditions of standard deontic logic describe the gapless, deductively closed and consistent type of norm-set . Our basic translations are similar to Alchourrón and Bulygin (1998) but with a slight diference in the deinientia since 'membership in Cn( )' is now replaced by 'membership in the (possibly deductively unclosed) norm-set ': 'p ' for 'Op', '¬p ' for 'Pp', '¬p ' for 'Fp' . In short, the connection between the set-theoretic notion of norm-set and the modal notion of obligation is given by the simple equation: = {p | Op}. he following correspondences hold:
1. It follows from the translation of principle (Def.) on the interdeinability of deontic notions that any norm-set is gapless (complete), Pp O¬p, making each doable state of afairs either permitted or forbidden. When translated to set-theoretic language the deinition (Def.) expresses a logical truth: ¬p or ¬p . 6 2. he translation of the necessitation rule (RN) gives the claim that logical truths are included in a norm-set, Cn(∅) ⊆ , while the translation of (K) axiom schema requires closure under modus ponens: If p → q and p , then q . Taken together, these two conditions are fulilled if a norm-set is deductively closed: = Cn( ).
3. he translation of the (D) axiom schema gives: If p , then ¬p . his condition is fulilled if a norm-set is free of contradiction, i.e. if it is consistent: ⊥ Cn( ).
On the descriptive side, it is empirically evident that the exempliication of any of these properties is a contingent matter. On the normative side, we must employ meta-normative principles or intuitions in order to evaluate whether some property ought to be encoded by a norm-set.
On the possibility of creating a norm-system by norm-promulgation
By its own deinition, theory is a deductively closed set, or symbolically: = Cn( ). Any deductively closed set is ininite thanks to the inclusion of logical truths, whose number is not inite, or symbolically: Cn(∅) ⊆ and |�| ≤ |Cn(∅)|. Consequently, one who agrees to deine a normative system as a set of command contents has an ontological obligation to concede that ininite objects exist, since normative systems are ininite sets, and also an epistemolo-Metanormative Principles and norm governed Social interaction
journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu gical obligation to investigate their knowability. If logical truths are subtracted from the set of consequences Cn * ( ) = Cn( ) -Cn(∅), the resulting set Cn * ( ) in addition to will contain relevant consequences, i.e., those elements whose deduction relies on a content from .
Example 2. Imagine that the normative system is created by the single command 'It is forbidden to see to it that something is the case if one desires it not to be the case' directed to a single actor i. 7 Can actor i become aware of all and each norm from the set Cn * ( )? Modal logic translation yields a conditional prohibition ' An actor is forbidden to see to it that something is the case (F i i:stit p) if she desires it not to be the case (D i ¬p)' , or symbolically: (1.2). In the set-theoretic approach, the deontic operator is replaced by the membership relation relation between a command content and its norm-set. he content of the command is: 'If actor i desires that ¬p then i does not see to it that p is the case' , or symbolically: (1.3). he content describes what conformation with the norm looks like and so it belongs to the single command norm-set , or symbolically: (1.4). 8
If the variable p ranges over sentences of an ininite language , then it provides ininitely many sentences that can replace p in (1.4). So, the number of sentences in the set Cn * ( ) will be ininite.
It is obvious that no normative source can complete the syntactic creation of an ininite set of command contents. Is it necessary to assume the existence of logical objects as ininite, deductively closed sets? he additional problem of deductive closure arises on the side of logic: is the consequence relation which deines a theory identical to the relation that deines the deductive closure of a norm-set? he thesis on the existence of a sui generis consequence relation in imperative language use (Žarnić 2011: 95) supports the rejection of the reduction of the consequence relation to the 'logic of observance' in the language of indicatives, just as Hans Kelsen claimed (Kelsen 1973: 254) .
One can easily avoid ontological commitment to the existence of ininite norm-sets or logical commitment to the reduction of imperative-logic to indicative-logic by adopting the deinition that a norm-set is merely a set of con-
Law and Logic journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu tents of explicit commands, and the thesis that the deductive closure of a normset under some logic is a contingent property.
Metanormative principles
Von Wright (1999: 33) introduced the notion of "normative demands on normative systems" or the notion of 'the metanormative principle' , as it will be called hereater [ another way] /…/ is to view the ideas of completeness and freedom of contradiction as themselves normative ideas, as normative demands on normative systems. hey could be called meta-normative principles. hey are norms of higher order.
At irst sight, it seems possible to understand meta-normative principles as claims that a norm-set ought to have a certain property and to express these claims in formal language by allowing embedded KD modalities. For the purpose of analysis of metanormative principles, the expressive power of formal language will be enriched by introducing S5 alethic modalities of necessity and possibility ◊. 9 Alethic modalities can be interpreted in diferent ways: as logical, as nomological, and as historical possibilities. 10 he concepts are ordered by inclusion: historical possibility is a nomological possibility and nomological possibility is a logical possibility.
he following list contains some prima facie plausible metanormative principles, denoted by tags of their formal translations given below:
− A norm-set ought to be gapless: (�.def.). − A norm-set ought to be deductively closed: (�.RN) with (�.K). 11 − A norm-set ought to be consistent: (�.D). − A norm-set ought to be realizable: (�.O◊). 12 − A norm-set ought to be realized: (�.T).
he following formal modal expressions for the listed metanormative principles are obtained using new symbol � for the second-order obligation:
9 S5 logic can be axiomatized by rule of necessity: If p, then p, axiom schemata:
5) ◊p → ◊p, and the deinition: ◊p ↔ ¬ ¬p.
10 Logical possibility is a world where laws of logic hold, nomological possibility is a world where logical and natural laws hold, and historical possibility is a nomological possibility that lies in the future of another nomological possibility. 11 If modality is interpreted as logical necessity, then the meta-principle says that a given norm-set ought to include all logical truths. 12 Modality ◊ can be interpreted as historical possibility in the remainder of the text. Metanormative Principles and norm governed Social interaction 
Since in the set-theoretic approach only irst-order translations can be given, the approach will have to be extended in order to accommodate metanormative expressions. One suggestive solution is to treat metanormative expressions as claims that a given norm-set type belongs to a certain class of norm-set types. he translation for the irst-order obligation Op is 'p is a member of the normset ' . Almost analogously, the statement 'property p is a perfection property' and its extensional reformulation 'the set of norm-sets satisfying condition p is a member of the perfection-set' seem to provide a viable translation for the second-order obligation claim �p. Let's call Perfect the set of sets of normsets sharing certain perfection properties. To say that a property p of normsets is a perfection property means to say that 'the set of norm-sets that satisfy condition p is an element in Perfect' , or symbolically '{ | satisies condition p} Perfect' .
Remark 3. If one accepts Gödel's assumption that the second order property of being a positive property creates an ultrailter, then a set of norm-sets having all perfection properties must be non-empty. Let's call it Ideal. Let a be the set of norm-sets having a certain perfection property. hen the expression 'a Perfect' means the same as 'Ideal ⊆ a' . An ultrailter of a given set is a set of its subsets that is closed under intersection and superset relation, the empty set is not its element and for any set either the set or its complement is a member of the ultrailter. 13
Remark 4. Can a norm-set have the property of making each doable state of afairs either obligatory or forbidden? Let's call this property the property of non-optionality since it leaves no place for optional acts and forbearances. If a normative system is conceived as generated by deduction from a normset, then it should be noted that Gödel's incompleteness theorem implies the unsatisiability of the condition p Cn( ) ¬p Cn( ) for a norm-set formulated in a language that is rich enough to express its own syntax (e.g., natural language). Since no normative system can satisfy this requirement, the property of non-optionality cannot be a perfection property under the Gödelian ontology of positive properties.
Next we proceed to the translation algorithm for the formulas where iterated deontic modalities of the same type are not allowed while irst-order deontic modalities are allowed to occur within the scope of second-order ones. 
his says that requiring only that which is the case is a perfection property of norm-sets and that is obviously not the intended translation for the principle a norm-set ought to be realized.
he unequal plausibility of the translations in examples (7) and (8) shows that second order obligations designated by the homonymous expression -'ought to be' in 'a norm-set ought to be realizable' and in 'a norm-set ought to be realized' -do not belong to the same category.
Roman Law principle as a norm for the norm-giver
We aim to draw a conceptual distinction between types of second order obligations with respect to the roles of actors involved in norm promulgation, norm realization and norm application. First, let our attention be drawn to the irst type, namely to the normative context of norm promulgation, the obligations for the norm-giver. he so-called 'Roman Law principle' forbids the norm-giver to require non-doable acts since no-one can be obliged to do the impossible. It will be shown that from the standpoint of standard deontic logic the use of the term 'principle' is unjustiied because the Roman Law principle will be satisied by a normative system whose norms consistently select only that which is possible.
he content Op → ◊p of the metanormative principle (�.O◊) has played an important role in normativity theory. Aristotle's claim that in deliberation "If people meet with an impossibility, they give up" (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b) can be understood as a contrapositive formulation of a related principle. In metanormative interpretation, the Aristotelian deliberation principle states that the impossible ought not to be the content of an intention. Closer to the (�.O◊) principle comes the Roman Law principle ultra posse nemo obligatur (ad impossibilia nemo tenetur, impossibilium nulla obligatio), itself a predecessor of the 'ought' implies 'can' principle that Kant formulated and for which Op → ◊p seems to be the direct translation. 14 Nevertheless, the logic of the actor's ability difers from the logic of alethic possibility. Some theorems of alethic logic fail in the logic of ability. For example, the thesis If something is the case, then it is possible, p → ◊p, is valid in alethic logic but its ability counterpart is not: the thesis If something is done, then it can be done fails in the logic of ability. 15 he metanormative principle with alethic modality is an over-generalization of these principles: whatever is forbidden because of alethic impossibility is also forbidden by the 'ought' implies 'can' principle, but the converse does not hold.
Terminologically speaking, the use of the term 'principle' is not correct in the context of principles (�.D) and (�.RN) since Op → ◊p is a theorem that follows from p → Op in conjunction with Op → Pp, i.e. from the contents of (�.D) and (�.RN). Two proofs, diferent in style, will be given for the fact. Proof. First, let us give a deduction proof relying on the syntax of the language. From p → Op and the deinitions of deontic and alethic modalities we obtain the corollary: If a state of afairs is permitted to be the case, then it is possible for it to be the case, Pp → ◊p. Assume that p is obligatory, Op. hen p is permitted, Pp, according to axiom D. From the corollary it follows that p is possible, ◊p. herefore, if a state of afairs is obligatory, then it is possible, Op → ◊p. Q.E.D.
14 here are numerous passages in Kant's works dealing with the principle. For example, in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), a succinct formulation is given as "duty commands nothing but what we can do" Kant (1998: 68) . 15 Picking the queen of hearts out of a card deck does not imply the ability to do so; see Brown (1992) . Proof. Second, let us give a proof in semantic terms! he basic semantic idea of modal logic is that the truth value of a formula at a point of valuation depends on the formula's truth values at other valuation points accessible via an appropriate relation. he deontic accessibility relation, Dwv, connects the world w to its normative alternatives v in which the norm-set is realized, ⊆ v for all v {v | Dwx}. Similarly, the alethic accessibility relation interpreted, say, as nomological possibility, Nwv, connects the world w to any of its alternatives v in which all logical and natural laws hold. For some modal formulas (Sahlqvist formulas), the corresponding irst-order property of the accessibility relation can be computed using the Sahlqvist-van Benthem algorithm. 16 It is known that Op → Pp determines the seriality property of the deontic relation,∀x∃y Dxy. As stated above, this means that the given norm-set is consistent. Using the algorithm the following interrelation properties can be computed:
• Op → ◊p determines ∀x∃y (Dxy Nxy) interrelation property. It could be termed as the 'convergent seriality property of a relation pair' and it says that there is always a deontically accessible situation which is also nomologically possible. Or to use Professor's Segerberg's metaphor, there are no tragic dilemmas (Segerberg, 2003) . A set of norms which exempliies this property provides a possible and legal way out of any situation.
• p → Op determines the subordination of the deontic relation under nomological ∀x∀y(Dxy → Nxy). A set of norms can be realized only in nomologically possible situations: if there is a legal way out of a situation, then this is also a possible way out. 17 It is easy to see that if the deontic relation is serial and subordinated to the nomological, it must always have a point of convergence with it, a point where norms are realized in a nomologically possible world. 18 herefore, 'ought' implies 'can' is not a self-justifying principle but a consequence of other principles. Q.E.D. 
NorMS aND SoCIaL INTeraCTIoN
Two actor roles in communication are commonly recognized: the role of sender and the role of receiver, but, in a norm governed social interaction, besides the roles of norm-giver and norm-subject there is an additional role, the role of norm-applier. Communication is a kind of action, and that, according to Parsons ' (1937) deinition, means that the sender has an aim in a situation whose conditions and means are subordinated to normative requirements. 19 he last condition in Parsons' deinition of action points to its normative dimension. Similarly, Habermas equates the social world with the normative context. 20 he acts related to norms (promulgation, observance, application), as acts and social facts, must have their own normative contexts which, according to our hypothesis, are made explicit in their metanormative principles.
Normative contexts for norm related acts
As noted above, in a norm governed interaction there are three actor roles: the norm-giver, the norm-subject and the norm-applier role; and there are three types of norm related actions: norm-promulgation, norm-regulated action, norm-based judgement. In this kind of interaction, a norm-giver by normpromulgation regulates the actions of a norm-subject whose observance of the norms is judged by a norm-applier.
First, we turn to the normative context of the norm-promulgation act. According to our interpretation, the language of KD logic is a description language and its axioms describe properties of norm-sets: the axiom K deines consequentiality and the axiom D deines consistency. If the promulgation of a norm-set is an act (in Parsons' sense) or a social fact (in Habermas' sense), then at least one of its properties is either permitted or forbidden. For example, if it is not considered desirable that a promulgated norm-set is inconsistent, then desirability of the consistency property constitutes the normative context for norm promulgation. his desirable property can be interpreted as a second-
Law and Logic journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu order obligation and can be expressed by the claim that a norm-set ought to be consistent, as stated in (�.D) above. As regards the question whether it is desirable that a norm-set has all of its deductive consequences, a negative answer seems inevitable since the production of an ininite text is not a doable act. herefore, the desirability of consistency belongs to a category diferent from the desirability of consequentiality or deductive closure.
Second, let us investigate the normative context of norm observance. A speciic type of desirability appears in the metanormative thesis (�.T), a thesis which can be plausibly interpreted as Conformation to norms is desirable, Duty must be done, Norms ought to be realized, and so on. 21 As noted above, it is not plausible, however, to interpret the thesis as a claim about a desirable property of a norm-set since the claim It is desirable that norms require only what is the case results in a kind of normative collapse. Rather, the thesis can be understood as an observance principle since it shows that a norm is that which ought to be observed. From this perspective, there is an important diference between the two meta-norms: unlike the norm-giver, the norm-subject has no obligations with respect to the properties of norm-sets, and unlike the norm-subject, the norm-giver has no obligations with respect to the observance of norms.
hird, let us discuss the normative context of norm application. he normapplier or judge decides on the deontic status of a state of afairs brought about by the norm-subject's act. Suppose that a norm-subject has brought about that p. he norm-applier has to determine the deontic status of p with respect to some norm-set and can do so by two logically equivalent methods: either by adding p to and testing the consistency of the extended set ∪ {p} or by examining whether ¬p is a consequence of . According to the irst method, if ∪ {p} is not consistent, then p is forbidden, and if it is consistent, then p is permitted, as shown in (2.5) and (2.6). A similar case holds for the second method, as shown in (2.7) and (2.8).
(2.6) If ¬p Cn( ), then Fp.
(2.7) If ¬p Cn( ), then Pp (2.8)
he norm-applier performs deduction but there is no "normative system", no deductively closed set Cn( ) that needs to precede or can result from the thus Metanormative Principles and norm governed Social interaction journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu obtained determination of the deontic status of the state of afairs brought about by a norm-subject act or by forbearance. Although the second-order requirement of deductive closure or the consequentiality principle does not deine the perfection-property of an empirical norm-set, it does deine the metanormative context for the norm-applier. he consequentiality principle shows that normative judgements ought to obey the laws of logic.
Directed second-order obligations. Diferent metanormative principles are attached to diferent roles in norm-governed interaction. While norms are always directed to norm-subjects, second-order obligations can be diferentiated by their addressees as shown in Table 1 . his fact indicates the need to reformulate the metanormative principles discussed in Section 1.3: second-order obligations � must be indexed by their holders' names. 22 If the norm-giver role is denoted by the index g, the norm-subject role by s and the norm-applier (judge) role by j, the selection of metanormative principles obtains the following reformulation:
he reading of reformulated metanormative principles can be given in terms of modal semantics. For example, (� j .K) reads 'he logical consequences of the norm-subject's obligations are norm-subject obligations in all the worlds where the norm-applier's obligations are satisied' . Norm-giver g ought to create norm-sets with perfection properties Norm-subject s ought to observe norms Judge j ought to apply norms 22 he same point has been made by Yamada (2011: 63) : "he formula of the form Oiφ means that it is obligatory upon agent i to see to it that φ. Although indexing of deontic operators with a set of agents is not standard in deontic logic, we need to be able to distinguish agents to whom commands are given from other agents if we are to use deontic logic to reason about how acts of commanding change situations".
